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Talking past each other
Karen Baehler’s (2005) interpretation of  my articles
(Gregory, 1998, 2002, 2004) indicates that we are largely
talking past each other. I believe we make a fundamentally
different assumption about the nature of politics in what
she refers to as ‘a healthy democratic polity’ (p.3), and
about the nature of a capitalist political-economic system.
Whereas Baehler acknowledges the importance of the
political dimensions of policy analysis and public
policymaking, I believe that these elements are more than
just important but essential, omnipresent, ineluctable and
conclusive in shaping public policy and its effects.
At the heart of  Baehler’s (2005, p.3) critique of  my less
sanguine views about rationality in public policy-making
is her argument – drawing on theoretical input from
other theorists – that the most appropriate role for the
policy analyst in a liberal democracy is ‘public argument
advising’. A public argument is ‘a coherent set of
propositions that lead from premises to a policy
conclusion’, and ‘presents the case for a particular policy
choice, including reasons why the policy should be
favoured’. It ‘presents the kind of policy case that
citizens will recognise as legitimate and worthy of
discussion, even if they disagree with the premises and
conclusions’. Baehler illustrates her advocacy of public
argument with reference to two examples from my
cited articles – the American government’s decision to
invade Iraq in 2003, and the application in New Zealand
of  ‘Rogernomics’ in the 1980s.
Moral dilemmas for the policy
adviser on Iraq
The essence of my argument regarding the role of a
policy analyst advising George W. Bush and his
colleagues in regard to the decision to invade Iraq was
that formal policy analysis (in that case, employing the
techniques of  ‘intervention logic’) confronts the paradox
of analytical rigour and political relevance. Analysis can
be rigorous (but of course it sometimes/often is not)
but it may also be rigorously irrelevant (to actual policy-
making) if it does not speak constructively to the agendas
that are driving decision makers. These agendas, as
Baehler fully acknowledges, may be overt or covert.
That is, they may be expressible as the sort of public
arguments she advocates, with which people may agree
or disagree, or they may not be expressible as such,
since many if not a majority of people would find
them obviously unacceptable, if not offensive – if they
were made aware of them. In the case of the invasion,
public debate could legitimately swirl around the
acceptability of such justifications as ‘regime change’
and/or ‘weapons of mass destruction’, or ‘bringing
democracy to Iraq’. But strategic control of Iraqi oil
resources or (as Baehler puts it, ) ‘exacting revenge for
old Bush family grievances or distributing lucrative post-
war reconstruction contracts to business cronies’ (p.4)
would hardly be viable public justifications.
Baehler argues that:
The best of  Bush’s defence and foreign policy
advisers under the circumstances would have
been aware of these possible motivations but
also kept their distance. They would have focused
exclusively on the kinds of  arguments that could be vetted
in public. They would have constructed these
arguments, tested them, and presented their
strengths and weaknesses, in the full knowledge that
their advice was unlikely to influence policy choice but
was nonetheless an important part of the historical record
(pp.4-5, emphasis added).
Would not this hypothetical policy adviser/analyst face
a compelling moral choice – to be willingly complicit
in an act of public deception (since he or she would
know the real reasons for the decision to invade), or to
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refuse to be complicit in decisions that they might even
think constituted war crimes?  If not, then the policy
adviser’s moral horizons seem purely Tennysonian –
‘Ours not to reason why, ours but to do and die’ –
except that in this case thousands of others have been
doing the dying. If  the ‘professionalism’ of  policy
analysts is to be gauged (at least in part) by their dutiful
willingness to serve, no matter how duplicitously, the
political interests of their sponsors then we should, I
believe, be extremely wary of constructing such
‘professional’ role expectations. The distinction between
‘spin doctoring’ and ‘public argument advising’ may be
a very fine one in many cases.
Government officials as individuals must retain, even
nurture, a capacity for personal reflective judgement,
even as they work in contexts and in roles which by
their nature insidiously limit that capacity. As Brian
Chapman (1959, p.275) observed:
 Neutrality in public office tends in the end to
moral corruption. If all governments are to be
served with equal impartiality and loyalty there
are no grounds at all for criticizing the German
official who served Hitler to the best of  his
ability. In any profession other than government
such people would be regarded as dangerous
cynics or weaklings.
So what should the policy analyst actually do? To ask
this question is to presuppose that there is some clear
course of action that an adviser ought to take. However,
any such clarity can be found only in the adviser’s own
mind, cannot necessarily be prescribed in some code
of professional conduct, and will depend heavily on
the circumstances of each case. It is ultimately a matter
of individual moral choice. In some instances advisers
might resign and publicly blow the whistle – thus
making ‘the undiscussable discussable’ – while in others
they might decide to do what the decision makers want
and say nothing to anyone, or they make choices that
lie somewhere in between. (The first option has the
great virtue of leaving its mark on the public record
for historical consideration.)
Public argument advice in the age
of ‘Rogernomics’: stellar or sterile?
Baehler rejects my argument (Gregory, 1998) that
especially between 1984 and 1987 New Zealand’s liberal
democracy became highly technocratic, its main features
being policy-making by an elite group which
determinedly ‘crashed through’ political institutions and
processes, the better to implement economic policies that
were profoundly ideological yet publicly paraded as being
‘scientifically’ rigorous. Instead, she claims that the policy
advice given to David Lange’s government was ‘a stellar
example of  public argument advising’ (p.5).
She concedes that key planks of the policy agenda
were rushed through Parliament in urgency, and that
many discussions were held behind closed doors.
But, ‘the advice itself was eminently presentable and,
if  presented, would have sparked a healthy, vigorous
public debate in almost any other democratic
country with a more heavily contested political
environment and longer experience with ideas of
deregulation, privatisation, and rolling back the state’
(p.5, emphasis added).
The conditional statement here – ‘if presented’ – is surely
contradictory. How can an example of  ‘public argument
advising’ be considered ‘stellar’, if in fact there is little or no
public (as distinct from private discussions among the elite)
argument that results from it? If, in other words, the advice is
democratically sterile?  Baehler lauds the ‘superb political skills
of the people driving the agenda and their ability to wield the
strong executive powers granted by the pre-MMP, first-past-
the-post parliamentary system’ (p. 6). But this is to praise them
for the abilities to close off, rather than to foster, public debate
on the policy advice which they offered and/or received.
It is true that much of the policy advice in those heady
times was made publicly available, efficiently and
enthusiastically – notably the briefing papers to ministers,
Economic Management (1984) and Government Management
(1987). Yet it was ironic that the scope for public
discussion of this material was severely constrained, by
the political strategy of  ‘crashing through’. Contrary to
what Baehler asserts, there were at the time (and have
been since) some academics who were publicly critical
of what was happening, but I would be very surprised
if their concerns were sought out and listened to by
those in the policy-making inner circle. Only the views
of  cheer-leaders were listened to, and they were not
needed in any case.
As I noted in my original article, one of the people driving
the agenda, Sir Geoffrey Palmer (1992, p. 13), later observed:
What has developed in New Zealand is
something of a disjunction between the
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policymaking process and the political process.
The decision-makers are a select few politicians
who decide things, not on the basis of what the
political process of representative democracy
tells them, but on the basis of what some
varieties of economic or policy theory tell them.
While I would reject the implication that ‘the policy-
making process’ (whatever that is) is not itself political
I would agree that Palmer here offers a sketch of the
strong technocratic tendencies that emerged during the
1980s, and which – by popular demand – were only
really rolled back by the push for a system of
proportional representation, the better to bring politics
more squarely back into this central arena of public
policy argument and deliberation. If the years of
‘Rogernomics’ constitute a ‘stellar example of public
argument advising’, then I for one would hate to see a
bad case of it.
Baehler goes on to say that, ‘Had the election of 1990
gone differently, yet more streams of  thinking could
have been incorporated [in the advisers’ “policy
architecture”], including perhaps a more social
democratic approach to social policy, which, combined
with the economic and state sector reforms, would
have constituted New Zealand’s unique brand of  third-
way governance’ (p.6). A principal reason why the 1990
election did not go differently was that the Labour
government had imploded by then – largely because
of overt ideological and political fissures, which could
not be surmounted by any appeal to the virtues of
public argument advice. In fact, it is worth noting that
both the Lange government which came into office in
1984 and the Bolger administration that was elected in
1990 pursued radical economic and social policies,
respectively, which had not really been foreshadowed
in their election campaigns. There is little or no evidence
that the drastic social welfare policies revealed in Ruth
Richardson’s ‘Mother of  All Budgets’ in 1991 were
widely anticipated by the New Zealand electorate. While
the policy advice which lay behind them might also be
regarded as a ‘stellar’ case of public argument advising,
the overwhelming emphasis – as with ‘Rogernomics’ –
was on the advising rather than the public argument.
Certainly strong public debate occurred after the policies
had been announced and pursued, and was a major
factor in Richardson being dropped as finance minister
after the National Party had won the 1993 election. But
the experiences of both the 1980s and early 1990s were
crucial in the subsequent moves, culminating in the
adoption of the MMP electoral system, to bring
parliamentary politics back to the centre of the public
policy process.
Some may complain that as a consequence New
Zealand governments now lack the flexibility of
response that was more readily available to them under
first-past-the-post, but others – myself among them –
would value more highly the democratic constraints
that have now been applied to the exercise of power
by the political executive. Is it not inconceivable that
the need to bargain and negotiate the security of
parliamentary votes of confidence and supply may carry
more democratic virtue than public argument advice
formulated by policy analysts locked in bureaucratic
ivory towers?
Power and reason
I agree with Baehler that the concept of ‘public
argument advising’ is a valuable idea in the quest to
define a legitimate role for policy analysts in a modern
democracy. However, I do not find anything new in it,
apart from the terminology itself.
Policy-makers – whether elected politicians, senior
public servants, political appointees in ministerial
offices, or the policy analysts who inhabit today’s
departments and ministries – have always engaged in
the profoundly political task of crafting coherent
public justifications for policy preferences. (Eichbaum
and Shaw argue in this issue of Policy Quarterly that the
relationships among these different players are evolving
in subtle ways.) But an emergent discipline like public
policy gives rise to more and more scholarly activity,
and the best of its enduring theoretical insights –
usually provided by the field’s best and earliest
luminaries – tend to get recycled in a new vocabulary,
and academic effort is invested in developing
refinements at the conceptual and theoretical margins.
This is no bad thing, as it provides us academics with
a style of life to which we feel entitled, and keeps us
off  the streets, out of  harm’s way. (Some might say
that the only harm involved befalls an unsuspecting
public, which bears the brunt of the practical
consequences of  academic ideas.)
The liberal academic mind-set places great value on the
role of reason in public policy-making, and the policy
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analysis industry is predicated on the belief that the
application of reason will inevitably lead to ‘better policy
outcomes’. For my part, however, I am deeply sceptical
about the extent to which such reasoning is scientific
rather than ideological, and about the extent to which
‘reasonable people’ can reason together to resolve
society’s most compelling conflicts of  political interest.
These conflicts are resolved through the alignment of
power relations rather than through the application of
analytical skill, and the enduring question in the quest
for ‘better policy outcomes’ remains unaddressed – that
is, better for whom?  If reason prevailed by the force
of logic and scientific conclusiveness in the vast domain
of public policy-making then it would hardly matter
which political parties were elected to office. (Some
would say that it does not matter much in any case.)
In a capitalist political economy a Marxian approach to
policy analysis would throw these underlying conflicts,
and the nature of  economic and political inequality, into
much sharper relief than will the mainstream analysis
produced in establishment bastions like the Treasury or
the Reserve Bank. When analysing, say, the problem of
poverty, either locally or internationally, why should such
an analytical framework be eschewed? Marx may have
placed far too much weight on a class-based
interpretation of historical social change, but his insights
into the basic conflict between capital and labour in a
capitalist international political economy continue to
illuminate the structural landscape of poverty and
economic inequality.
In regard to the central conflict between capital and
labour, it is interesting to contrast political language used
at the time of the 1951 industrial conflict in New Zealand
and the debate surrounding the introduction of the
Employment Contracts Act 40 years later. In the former,
the conflict was represented in nakedly honest terms –
‘smashing the power of the militant unions’ or ‘fighting
for a fair go from exploitative employers’, or whatever.
In 1991, however, while still lying at the heart of this
issue of  public policy, it was spoken of  by policy elites
as if the quest for what was now called ‘labour market
flexibility’ was essentially a technical issue, around which
all ‘reasonable’ people might sooner or later arrive at a
‘reasonable’ consensus. One of  the crucial changes in
the intervening 40 years had been the rise of  labour
market economics and its impact on the way in which
mainstream policy analysis framed, verbalised – and
sanitised – the conflict. The thought that policy analysts
employing predominantly Marxian frames of reference
within which to fashion their ‘policy argument advice’
could be taken at all seriously within the citadels of
policy orthodoxy such as the Treasury and the Reserve
Bank, or in the wider community for that matter, is
almost laughingly incongruous.
Of course, in a liberal democracy like New Zealand
the dominant political economy is grounded in
popular legitimacy. What we might call ‘mainstream
policy analysis’ in governmental agencies reflects and
supports this concentration of power at the political
centre. Few, if  any, New Zealanders are clamouring
for some sort of neo-Marxian revolution. But this is
only to acknowledge the fact that conventional policy
analysis largely serves the predominant political forces
in society. In so doing it also serves to ensure that the
scope of options remains very limited: power is
aligned in ways that ensure many alternatives never
get onto the policy-making agenda, which was seldom
more limited in the 1980s when the policy elite insisted
that ‘there is no alternative’.
The reason that is most highly valued in government is
the ‘reasonableness’ defined by those in positions of
political and economic privilege. Take, for example,
the economic and state sector reforms of  the 1980s.
These were promoted in the name of the public interest,
yet why was it that thousands of New Zealanders were
severely hurt by these changes while most if not all
members of the policy elite that drove them did not
themselves bear the financial brunt of the changes, and
in some notable cases subsequently did very nicely out
of them? The political and ideological character of neo-
classical economics (in fact of any brand of economic
theory, including Keynesian theory) was confirmed
when two of the main policy advisers behind the radical
economic changes of the 1980s – Don Brash and
Graham Scott – decided to become overtly political
players. The former, of  course, left his job as Governor
of  the Reserve Bank (a position in which he had enjoyed
a high degree of ‘political independence’ yet had
delivered a number of profoundly political speeches
of neo-liberal policy advocacy) to enter Parliament and
later become leader of  the National Party, and the latter
stood for Parliament in this year’s election as a member
of  ACT.  Such overt declarations of  political faith by highly
influential technocrats – of whatever ideological stripe –
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are rare in New Zealand, and in my view are to be
applauded and encouraged. There is, after all, no such
thing as political neutrality in policy analysis.
Building capability?
The old saying that knowledge is power is trite, and it
is far less persuasive than the recognition that it is power
that generally governs, not knowledge. Only massive
shifts in power alignments, domestically and
internationally, would open up real possibilities for
‘solving’ problems of  world poverty, not a further
burgeoning of the policy analysis industry (or rock
concerts organised in the name of Bob Geldof). What
is commonly overlooked is that one person’s ‘problem’
is another’s ‘solution’, and reasoned argument will usually
do little to change that. (Years ago, in New Zealand
two or three people out of work constituted an
unemployment problem. Then from the mid-1970s
increasing levels of structural unemployment became a
‘problem’ mainly for those who were out of work,
while in more recent times there has emerged the
‘rational’ argument that there is a  ‘natural level of
unemployment’. As if political, social and economic
relations in society are somehow shaped by general laws
analogous to those which determine the physical world.)
The current fad called ‘evidence-based policy’ is the
latest attempt to fudge the reality of power relations,
and those who buy into it should remember the pitifully
symbolic sight of  the former American Secretary of
State, Colin Powell, presenting ‘evidence’ to the United
Nations in February 2003 of  Saddam Hussein’s
‘weapons of mass destruction’. Even though such an
example of power trumping evidence is not typical in
common-or-garden policy analysis conducted on
matters far less spectacular than criminal aggression
against another country, what passes as ‘evidence’ is itself
politically determined, not necessarily in any party
partisan sense (although that can be so) but because in
public policy-making the ‘facts’ are always selectively
chosen and never speak for themselves.
Consider, for example, Simon Chapple’s (2000) critical
analysis of  the statistical evidence germane to the former
‘Closing the Gaps’ policy on ‘Mäori socio-economic
disparity’.1 His paper was highly contentious politically,
his analysis was strongly contested by other researchers
(Alexander and Williams, 2001), and probably no one
today can say conclusively what the ‘true’ evidence actually
is. Generally, it is doubtful if  there can be any evidence
that is politically authoritative by virtue of its manifest
conclusiveness, especially in the highly ambiguous arena
of social policy (Lindblom and Cohen, 1979). All
evidence is politically (and academically) contestable, which
is why democratic norms and values should hold sway
over technocratic ones.
Whether we know it or not, and whether we like it or
not, those of us who research and teach in academic
institutions like the School of Government at Victoria
University of  Wellington and the Australia and New
Zealand School of  Government (ANZSOG) serve
power as much as knowledge. If we do not know it, or
do not acknowledge it, we are deceiving ourselves in the
name of ‘education’, or these days in our endeavours to
produce ‘learning outcomes’. We become less genuinely
critical in our thinking, and are less able to see that the
public sector ‘capability’ we seek to help build is not
primarily a technical but a political capacity. And we
simply become – for the most rational of instrumental
reasons – servants of  the establishment, though probably
well rewarded for our earnest compliance.
Inherent in all policy analysis in a liberal democracy is
the tension between the desire to enhance the political
dimensions of policy discussion and debate, and at the
same time to  search for modes of analysis which can
better inform such contestation. I refer to this as the
relationship between what can perhaps loosely be called
‘experiential knowledge’, on the one hand, and
‘experimental knowledge’, on the other. Karen Baehler’s
promotion of the idea of ‘public argument advice’
clearly acknowledges this relationship. Where we part
company, I believe, and as demonstrated in her belief
in the utility of  ‘intervention logic’, is that I would assert
the primacy of politics and power, rather than of
analytical calculation, in determining winners and losers
in the polity – what some others may call, less
provocatively, the distribution of  policy costs and benefits.
I think this difference is apparent in Baehler’s (2005, p.9)
sidebar discussion of   ‘How to Treat Policy Whiplash’ –
the ‘effects of sudden policy starts, stops, and reversals’
that are borne by public servants and public agencies.
This could be expected if the election were to have
resulted in a centre-right government replacing the centre-
1 Chapple criticised the view that socio-economic gaps between
Maori and Pakeha were widening, arguing that contrary to popular
rhetoric Maori did not share a common experience of disadvantage.
V
ol
um
e 
1,
 N
um
be
r 
4 
20
05
31
left one. In her view, ‘In addition to producing these
stresses, the habit of reverting to previous policies rather
than advancing new ideas may indicate stale policy thinking
and a lack of continuous improvement in policy
formulation.’ She advocates that advisers should try to
be familiar with the fullest range of possible arguments
and ideas in their policy areas and be able to learn from
past policies, rather than be ‘trapped in ideological
stereotypes’ or be ‘dazzled by the next new policy fashion
being marketed as best practice’.
Three cheers for all that. But given the powerful
institutional constraints – which may be subsumed under
the term ‘bureaucratic politics’ – that act on policy
advisers, we should not underestimate the real difficulties
they would face in trying to follow this advice.
Notwithstanding this, the metaphor of ‘policy whiplash’
connotes a strongly negative interpretation of policy
change (who thinks of whiplash as being something
desirable?), whereas from a political – indeed,
democratic – standpoint it may be a great virtue.
Although I do not attribute it to Baehler, there could
be a suggestion in the idea of  ‘whiplash’ that policy –
formulated largely by ‘experts’ – needs a measure of
protection against the capricious behaviour of elected
politicians. Yet one person’s ‘whiplash’ is another’s
democratic responsiveness. (Many Mäori would
certainly welcome some ‘whiplash’ on the foreshore
and seabed policy.)
It would also be interesting to know how a policy analyst
using the tool of  intervention logic could build into his
or her calculations the consequences of ‘whiplash’
without at the same time undermining the utility of
their analysis. The only way to do it would be to factor
in a change in government as a policy ‘risk’, but the idea
of risk in this context must also address the question: a
risk for whom? Again, one person’s policy risk is
another’s political opportunity.
Conclusion
Whether or not there was any sort of general social
and political consensus that held together in New
Zealand during most of the 1950s (after the ‘militant’
unions had been dealt to) and 60s, it is certainly true
that by the mid-1970s any such consensus was being
put under great strain as adverse economic conditions
hit home. This situation made underlying conflicts more
apparent at the level of everyday politics, and
governments’ attempts to forge some new social and
political agreement were manifest in the efforts of the
New Zealand Planning Council. Reasonable people
could talk reasonably together. Yet, political power in
the form of  authoritarian Muldoonism controlled the
public policy agenda, and when that was swept aside
by a disillusioned electorate, David Lange’s government
quickly cast aside the pretence of consultation and
planning, and went for broke in its efforts to impose
solutions from above. An autocrat was cast aside in
favour of  a group of  technocrats.
Policy analysis played its role in all of  this, especially
under the Lange government.   But it was the appeal to
the authority of theoretical knowledge that carried the
day politically, not the theoretical knowledge itself, since
it was not produced in a political vacuum. In this way,
knowledge – or what passed as knowledge – was given
the legitimacy of  power.
The trouble with rationalist interpretations of public
policy-making is that they fail, continually, to properly
acknowledge the centrality of  political power. Of
course, it is not that an intellectual or practical choice
has to be made between the application of social science
research, on the one hand, and the exercise of political
power, on the other. What is always at issue is the on-
going relationship between the two (Gregory, 1998).
The rational wheel of policy analysis is reinvented in
various new guises, as if little or nothing is learned from
earlier policy nostrums and failed expectations. The
worst outcome of this is not so much policy failure
(itself  a politically subjective term), but the continued
tendency to attribute the blame for such failures to
politicians, often considered to be obtuse, opportunistic,
or plain stupid. For these reasons any adequate education
for those whose business it is to apply their intelligence
to the quest for ‘better’ public policy should include an
appreciation of the nature of power and politics and
how it provides the dynamic of policy choice. Simply
acknowledging the importance of politics then
proceeding as if it were ultimately decisive simply will
not do. I have used here for illustrative purposes a simple
reference to one of  history’s great political and
economic thinkers, Karl Marx. But we do not have to
be, or be considered to be, Marxists if we acknowledge
that one of the great virtues in his writings was to
identify squarely the conflictual nature of a capitalist
political economy. Call this ‘realism’, if  you like, but if
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those who work in government do not have an adequate
understanding of the dynamics of politics and political
institutions, and believe that somehow they can be
circumvented in the pursuit of rational policy-making,
then they will continue to be frustrated.
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